




Assessing Economic Damages in Personal Injury and 






George A. Schieren 
Department of Economics 
Appalachian State University 





Gary R. Albrecht 
Albrecht Economics, Inc 
1817 Georgia Ave. 

















                                                                                                                                                                  2
Assessing Economic Damages in Personal Injury and Wrongful 






This article is one in a series of articles in the Journal of Forensic Economics detailing 
the different and the common methods for assessing economic damages in the various 
states. In this article we discuss the legal framework by which economic damages are 
computed in personal injury and wrongful death cases in the state courts of North 
Carolina.  The relevant state statutes, case precedents, and North Carolina Pattern 
Instructions (jury) are presented for the various aspects of a forensic economist’s work in 
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Assessing Economic Damages in Personal Injury and Wrongful 





This article is one in a series of articles in the Journal of Forensic Economics detailing 
the different and the common methods for assessing economic damages in the various 
states. In this article we discuss the legal framework by which economic damages are 
computed in personal injury (PI) and wrongful death (WD) cases in the state courts of 
North Carolina.  Section II presents the legal framework for these torts, Section III 
discusses the calculation of damages in Wrongful Death torts, while Section IV deals 
with Personal Injury torts where they differ from Wrongful Death. Section V highlights 
practice and other issues for forensic economists in North Carolina. 
 




An expert economist’s testimony as to the present monetary value of economic damages 
arising from personal injury or wrongful death is admissible. The testimony of an expert 
can provide a reasonable basis for the computation of damages even though, at best, the 
result is approximate. Beck v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 57 N.C. App. 373, 291 S.E. 
2d 897, affirmed 307 N.C. 267, 297 S.E. 2d 397 (1982). 
 
In Beck the court wrote: 
 
In allowing recovery under this statute [North Carolina General Statutes 28A-18-
2], the North Carolina courts have recognized that, by necessity, some speculation 
is necessary in determining damages.  In Bowen v. Constructors Equip. Rental 
Co., 283 N.C. 395, 196 S.E.2d 789 (1973), the court noted that monetary recovery 
cannot be denied simply “because no yardstick for ascertaining the amount 
thereof has been provided.” 
 
In Powell v. Parker, 62 N.C. App. 465 (1983), it is recognized that “some speculation is 
necessary in determining damages” and that recovery can not be denied simply because 
the loss may be difficult to measure. Courts will not allow expert testimony “based upon 
obviously inadequate data.” Rutherford v. Air Conditioning Co., 38 N.C. App 630 (1978).  
However, “whether certain data is a sufficient basis for an opinion will often be a matter 
within the witness’ expertise.” 
  
In general, questions of sufficient basis for the opinion are left for cross-examination 
Short v. Chapman, 261 N.C. 674, (1964).  
 
In determining the appropriate amount of compensation for such loss, "the age 
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and occupation of the injured person, the nature and extent of his employment, the 
value of his services and the amount of his income at the time, whether from fixed 
wages or salary, are matters properly to be considered by the jury," and "great 
latitude" is allowed in the introduction of such evidence. "The right of cross-
examination provides the opposing party opportunity to challenge estimates of 
this nature." 
 
B. Wrongful Death 
 
North Carolina has established statutory rights for dealing with wrongful death torts and 
their associated damages – a right that did not exist under common law. Damages in 
wrongful death cases are governed by General Statute 28A-18-2 (b).  The damages 
recoverable for death by wrongful act include: 
 
1) Expenses for care, treatment and hospitalization incident to the injury resulting 
in death;  
2) Compensation for pain and suffering of the decedent;  
3) The reasonable funeral expenses of the decedent;  
4) The present monetary value of the decedent to the persons entitled to receive 
the damages recovered, including but not limited to compensation for the loss of 
the reasonably expected:  
a. Net income of the decedent,  
b. Services, protection, care and assistance of the decedent, whether  
  voluntary or obligatory, to the persons entitled to the damages  
 recovered, 
c. Society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice of  
  the decedent to the persons entitled to the damages recovered; 
5) Such punitive damages as the decedent could have recovered had he survived, 
and punitive damages for wrongfully causing the death of the decedent through 
maliciousness, willful or wanton injury, or gross negligence;  
6) Nominal damages when the jury so finds. 
 
The wrongful death statute confers a right of action for fair and just compensation for the 
pecuniary injury resulting from death, recoverable by the personal representative for the 
benefit of a specific class of heirs. Only the personal representative of the deceased, his 
executor or administrator, may bring suit for damages, and any damages recovered must 
be distributed under the laws of intestacy in North Carolina. Proceeds recovered under 
the wrongful death statute are not part of the estate and are not distributed by provisions 
of a will, but according to the Intestate Succession Act. Harrison v. Carter, 226 N.C. 36, 
36 S.E.2d 700 (1946); Bowen v. Constructors Equip. Rental Co. 
 
The damages are to individuals who may have reasonably expected to receive benefit(s) 
from the deceased.  Cases confirming that damages are limited to those who may have 
reasonably expected to receive benefits include: Bowen v. Constructors Equip. Rental Co, 
Carver v. Carver 310 N.C. 669 (1984), and more recently, Bahl v. Talford, 138 N.C. 
App. 119 (2000).   These cases all involved the death of children. Such cases are 
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exceptions to the norm and as such, have generated a number of  recorded appeals.  
Initially, in the Bahl v. Talford case, the parents were awarded money for income they 
might reasonably have expected from the deceased daughters. This case was remanded 
because no evidence was presented at trial to show that the deceased had ever expressed 
an intent to provide income to the parents.  The daughters were 11 and 16 at the time of 
death.   
 
The “services” in paragraph 4(b) of the statute have been construed in actual cases to be 
the household maintenance services typically considered by forensic economists. These 
would include care of a dwelling, inside and out, care of children or adults unable to 
provide their own care, food preparation, etc. 
 
In State v. Smith 90 N.C. App. 161 (1988) the deceased’s annual gross income was 
estimated to be $25,000.  The parents’ life expectancy was 30 years resulting in a loss 
estimated to be $750,000 with a present value of $500,000.  The Appeals Court stated 
that the trial court: 
 
…erred, however, in using the victim’s annual salary as a base figure… only the 
“reasonably expected” net income of the decedent can be recovered… 
No evidence was presented at the sentencing hearing to show that either of the 
victim’s parents reasonably expected to receive any, let alone all, of his income.  
Since the restitution order is not supported by the evidence, it cannot be allowed 
to stand. 
 
The reason the judgment was vacated appears to be either because (a) gross instead of net 
income was used or (b) no evidence was provided that the parents could be expected to 
receive any income from the daughters. This decision was affirmed by the North Carolina 
Supreme Court, State v. Smith 323 N.C. 703 (1989). 
 
There does not seem to be any question concerning reasonably expected when the 
survivor is a spouse and/or child.  From Bowen v. Constructors Equip. Rental Co,: 
 
If the persons entitled to receive the damages recovered were a wife and child or 
children, obviously the present value of their monetary loss would involve 
different considerations.  If the persons entitled to the damages recovered were 
collateral relatives whose contacts with the decedent were casual and infrequent, 
there may be no basis for the recovery of any significant amount under paragraph 
(4). 
 
The legislature intended the damages recoverable under the wrongful death statute to 
compensate the beneficiaries in manner such as restores them to the position they would 
have had experienced had there been no death. Scallon v. Hooper, 58 N.C App. 551, 293 
S.E.2d 843 (1982), cert. denied, 306 N.C. 744, 295 S.E. 2d 480 (1980) and  Beck v. 
Carolina Power & Light Co. In addition to lost earnings and services, these recoverable 
damages include such items as lost health care insurance and reduced pension benefits to 
which the beneficiaries would have been entitled.  
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C. Personal Injury 
 
The North Carolina Pattern Instructions  (NCPI 810.00) for personal injury state:  
 
The plaintiff may also be entitled to recover actual damages.  On this issue the 
burden of proof is on the plaintiff.  This means that the plaintiff must prove, by 
the greater weight of the evidence, the amount of actual damages [proximately 
caused by the negligence]  [caused by the wrongful conduct] of the defendant. 
 
 
The possible damages are enumerated in NCPI – 810.02: 
 
Actual damages are the fair compensation to be awarded to a person for any [past] 
[present] [future] injury [proximately caused by the negligence]  [caused by the 
wrongful conduct] of another.  
In determining the amount, if any, you award the plaintiff, you will consider the 
evidence you have heard as to: 
 [medical  expenses] 
  [loss of earnings] 
  [pain and suffering] 
  [scars or disfigurement] 
  [(partial) loss (of use) of part of the body] 
[permanent injury] 




III. Wrongful Death Damages 
 
A. Life Expectancy 
 
In determining the reasonable value of the loss to survivors of the decedent, the loss is 
calculated over the life expectancy of the deceased, or the life expectancy of the persons 
entitled to receive the damages if it is shorter than that of the deceased. Bowen. In either 
case, the life expectancy is mandated by the statutory mortality table in N.C General 
Statute 8-46. This is a unisex, unified race table last updated in 2004 (see Appendix 1 for 
comparisons of North Carolina and recent United States life expectancies). The 
legislature’s source for this table is unknown to the authors. Differences between male 
and female, or between black and white expectancies are not admissible, nor is the fact 
that life expectancies are generally increasing over time. The statutory table is not 
conclusive by itself as to life expectancy, but must be considered in connection with “the 
other evidence as to the health, constitution and habits” of the deceased. Russell v. 
Windsor Steamboat Co., 126 N.C. 961, 36 S.E. 191 (1900). 
 
B. Earning Capacity 
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In wrongful death cases, there is no indication in the jury instructions or in case law that 
the “net income” is anything other than “expected” income, not capacity. However, the 
jury instructions and case law in personal injury torts explicitly recognize that in at least 
some situations, earning capacity is the measure to use (see Part IV.B). North Carolina 
Pattern Instructions say in part (N.C.P.I. 810.50): 
 
  Damages  for  (name deceased’s) death also include fair compensation for 
the present monetary value of (name deceased) to his next-of-kin….You may consider: 
    [The net income (name deceased) would have earned during the remainder 
of his life. You must subtract from (name deceased’s) reasonably expected income the 
amount he would spent on himself or for other purposes which would not have benefited 
his next of kin. The amount he would have earned depends upon his prospects in life, 
health, character, ability, industry and [the means he had for making money] [the 
business in which he was employed]. It also depends upon his life expectancy – that is, 
the length of time he could reasonably have been expected to live but for the [negligence] 
[wrongful conduct] of the defendant]. 
 
  The North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions (NCPI) are neither easy to locate nor 
use because annual supplements must regularly be used to replace original instructions. A 
committee made up of ten superior court judges meets monthly from August through 
June to create instructions for both civil and criminal court. In June of each year all 
new/revised instructions are published as supplements to the North Carolina Pattern Jury 
Instructions, Volume 1 (Criminal) and Volume 2 (Civil). The original compilation of 
instructions and the supplements are published by the Institute of Government at the 
University of North Carolina School of Government, Chapel Hill, North Carolina. 
Complete volumes may be obtained from the North Carolina Bar Association (1-800-
662-7407), and annual supplements may be obtained from the Institute of Government 
(www.sogpubs.unc.edu).  
 
C. Work-life Expectancy 
 
There is no statute or jury instruction relating specifically to the determination of a 
person’s work-life expectancy. However, it must be considered because the jury 
instruction (NCPI – 810.50) refers to “The net income he would have earned during the 
remainder of his life…The amount he would have earned depends upon his prospects in 
life, health, character, ability, industry, and the means he had for making money.” 
 
D. Personal Consumption Deduction 
 
The jury instructions state (NCPI – 810.50), “You must subtract from deceased’s 
reasonably expected income the amount he would have spent on himself or for other 
purposes which would not have benefited his next-of-kin.” State v. Smith confirms that 
net income, as opposed to gross income, must be used to determine the loss. There is no 
case law regarding how the amount subtracted is to be determined.   
 
E. Household Services 
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“Services, protection, care and assistance of the decedent, whether voluntary or 
obligatory, to the persons entitled to the damages recovered…” are a part of the statutory 
recoverable damages. The only elaboration of the determination of these damages is in 
the jury instructions (NCPI – 810.50), “These words are to be given their ordinary 
meanings. You may consider the family and personal relations between the deceased and 
his next-of-kin…” 
 
F. Fringe benefits 
 
Nothing in the statute or in case law addresses this issue. Therefore, forensic economists 
may, and oft-times do, include such calculations. 
 
G. Income Taxes 
 
There is nothing in the statute or in the jury instructions specifying that income taxes 
must be deducted from lost income. However, the term “net income” is used repeatedly 
in the jury instructions, and in an appeal not involving wrongful death/personal injury but 
an allowance under a will, the Court of Appeals held that the words “net income” meant 
income after deducting federal and state income taxes. Pritchard v. First-Citizens Bank 
and Trust, 38 N.C. App. 489; 248 S.E.2d 467; 1978.  In Scallon v. Hooper the court does 
state “it is a reversible error for the trial court to instruct the jury that damages awarded in 
a wrongful death action are exempt for federal and state income taxes.” 
 
Again, because nothing in the statute or case law addresses FICA taxes, such taxes and 
benefits may be considered by a forensic economist on a case-by-case basis. 
 
H. Present Value 
 
The jury instructions say (NCPI – 810.50), “Any amount you allow as damages for the 
future monetary value of the deceased to his next-of-kin must be reduced to its present 
value, because a smaller sum received now is equal to a larger sum received in the 
future.” Then, even if the future monetary value has been reduced to its present value, the 
instructions state, “Whether it has in fact been so reduced is for you to determine from 
the evidence and from your logic and common sense.”  
 
No case law was found regarding the discount rate to use in a wrongful death action, but 
in a determination of the present value of a partnership as part of a marriage dissolution, 
the Court of Appeals said, “While the method used was not unreasonable, the interest rate 
used to discount the payments to defendant of his interest in the partnership was 
relatively low. The trial judge did not explain why he used this particular rate. The 
plaintiff notes in her brief that this is the rate used in G.S. 8-47 to calculate the present 
worth of annuities payable annually to a person during his life. We do not believe that the 
purpose of that statue was to cover cases such as the present, where the trial judge sought 
to find the actual or true net value of the partnership interest to defendant in 1983. We 
take notice that the rate of 4 ½% was far below the going or market rate in 1983, and that 
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the use of it produced a present value thousands of dollars in excess of the actual or 
market value of the money. We therefore remand for a recalculation of the partnership 
interest, using a rate reasonably in keeping with the fair market value of the money. 
Reasonable rates of comparison, for example, might include the rate used by the Internal 
Revenue Service in determining assessments and refunds, Treasury bill rates, or the 
prime rate charged by banks.” Weaver v. Weaver, 72 N.C. App 409; 324 S.E.2d 915; 
1985. 
 
This ruling would seem to indicate the use of a current market interest rate, however such 
a rate might be determined. The Weaver v. Weaver ruling is not one that is particularly 
cited in Wrongful Death/Personal Injury cases. It is simply one of the few appealed cases 
involving the discount rate. Since there is no mandated way to deal with a discount rate, 
either by statute or case law or jury instructions, different experts use a variety of 
different methods. The authors are familiar with cases where net discount rates (both real 
and nominal) were used, portfolios of differing bond maturities were used, and an 
historical nominal rate was used. Sometimes tax-adjusted rates have been used, and 
sometimes taxes have been accounted for in the earnings of both the decedent and the 
award interest. The method most commonly seen has been a real net discount rate, but 
that is because one expert has done so much work in North Carolina for the last thirty 
years and uses such an approach 
 
IV. Personal Injury 
 
A. Life Expectancy 
 
The NCPI includes Mortality tables (N.C.P.I. 810.14).  The tables, described above, are 
to be used in personal injury cases “Whenever it is necessary to establish the expectancy 
of continued life of any person from any period of the person’s life…”   In addition to the 
data in the tables, factors specific to the individual involved such as health and habits can 
be considered by the jury. 
 
B. Earning Capacity 
 
The N.C.P.I. Instructions state (NCPI – 810.06): 
 
Damages for personal injury also include fair compensation for the [past] 
[present] [future] loss of time from employment, loss from inability to perform 
ordinary labor, or the reduced capacity to earn money experienced by the 
plaintiff...  
In determining this amount, you should consider the evidence as to:  
[the plaintiff’s age and occupation] 
[the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s employment] 
[the value of the plaintiff’s services] 
[the amount of the plaintiff’s income at the time of his injury from salary, wages 
or other compensation] 
[the effect of the plaintiff’s disability or disfigurement on his earning capacity] 
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[the plaintiff’s loss of profits from his business or profession] 
[and the loss of capacity to earn money] 
[specify any other factor supported by the evidence].  
(The fact that a person [was not working at the time of his injury] [had not begun 
to work at the time he was injured] does not, in and of itself, prevent a person 
from recovering fair compensation for loss of future earning capacity.) 
 
Two cases, Johnson v. Lewis, 251 N.C. 797 (1960) and Purgason v. Dillon 9 N.C. App. 
529, (1970) state that it is not necessary for an individual to be employed at the time of 
injury in order to be compensated for the diminished ability to work.  Both contain the 
quote: 
 
A person is not deprived of the right to recover damages because of inability to 
labor or transact business in the future, because of the fact that at the time of the 
injury he is not engaged in any particular employment… The fact that a woman 
attends merely to household duties will not deprive her of a right to recover for 
loss of earning capacity. 
 
This reasoning is also used for children who have no earning history.  Kirk v. Hannon, 
142 N.C. App. 267 (2001) confirms that a child can be compensated for impairment of 
his or her earning capacity he or she would have had once attaining majority.   
 
In the injury of a child there are two causes of action, Emanuel v. Clewis, 272 N.C. 505, 
1968. An action on behalf of the child to recover damages for pain and suffering, 
permanent injury and impairment of earning capacity after attaining majority; and (2) an 
action by the parent, ordinarily the father, for (a) loss of the services and earnings of the 
child during minority and (b) expenses incurred for necessary medical treatment for the 
child's injuries. 
 
Profits from Business 
 
In Smith v. Corsat, 260 N.C. 92 (1963) the Supreme Court writes that the profits of a 
business are not to be considered when the business depends in part on the employment 
of capital and the labor of others for the purpose of establishing the value of the lost time 
or diminished earning capacity because profits are uncertain and speculative.  The court 
goes on to state that: “In such case, the measure of damages is the loss in value of the 
injured person's services in the business.”  The exception is when the business is small 
and relies principally on the personal services and attention of the owner in which case 
the profits may be “useful in helping to determine the pecuniary value of loss of time or 
impairment of earning capacity.”  
 
The exception is exemplified in a citation from Young and Young v. William Stewart, Jr. 
and A-1 Services, Ltd., 101 N.C. App 312; 399 S.E.2d 344 (1991).  
 
This court has held that various cases fit into this exception and has approved the 
admission of evidence of business earnings to show lost earning capacity resulting 
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from negligently inflicted injury. In Griffin v. Disco, Inc., 49 N.C. App. 77, 270 
S.E. 2d 613 (1980), the Court held admissible evidence of plaintiff’s business 
earnings where plaintiff owned and operated a paint and body shop and employed 
only one laborer. In Rolling Fashion Mart, Inc. v. Mainor, 80 N.C. App. 213, 341 
S.E.2d 61 (1986), the Court stated that evidence of business earnings of a small 
door-to-door sales company, having only one employee – its president – would be 
admissible in a suit for lost earning capacity brought by its president. In Smith v. 
Pass, 95 N.C. App. 243, 382 S.E.2d 781 (1989), the Court held admissible 
evidence of plaintiff’s van pool business earnings. The common thread in all of 
these cases is that each plaintiff’s business earnings resulted from the personal 
efforts of the plaintiff and not from employment of capital or labor of others. 
 
C. Work-life Expectancy 
 
As in the wrongful death situation, there is no statute or jury instruction relating 
specifically to the determination of a person’s work-life expectancy. The NCPI states that  
when determining damages in personal injury cases the jury is to consider evidence 
regarding the plaintiff’s age and occupation and the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s 
employment (NCPI – 810.06). 
 
D. Personal Consumption Deduction 
 
In personal injury cases there are no personal consumption deductions. 
 
E. Household Services 
 
The N.C.P.I. do not directly address the determination of household services.  Damages 
may include “any other element of damages supported by the evidence” (N.C.P.I. 
810.14).  In Johnson v. Lewis the court quotes Rodgers v. Boynton, 314 Mass. 279, 52 
N.E. 2d 576, 151 A.L.R. 475 that the injured woman “was entitled to have considered in 
the assessment of her damages her inability, due to the injury, to perform her household 
duties, just as she would be entitled to have considered any other restriction, due to the 
injury, of her activities." Economic experts routinely calculate household services lost 
because of personal injury or wrongful death, but the basis for these calculations is as 
varied as the number of experts performing them. 
 
F. Fringe benefits 
 
The N.C.P.I. refers to “earnings” (NCPI – 810.02) and “capacity to earn.”  What 
constitutes earnings, i.e., how (or if) fringe benefits are to be calculated or included, is not 
elaborated on in the Pattern Instructions, and no case law was found. It is, however, 
common practice to include fringe benefits in the determination of economic losses. 
 
G. Income Taxes 
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Nothing in the Pattern Instructions gives instruction specific to the treatment of taxes, and 
no case law was found on the topic of personal injury and taxes.  Because income taxes 
are deducted from earnings in wrongful death cases according to the statute, they are 
customarily deducted in personal injury cases. 
 
H. Present Value 
 
The Pattern Instructions for personal injury state (NCPI – 810.16), “Any amount you 
allow as the future damages for …must be reduced to its present value, because a smaller 
sum received now is equal to a larger sum received in the future.” As is the case for a 
wrongful death action, no specific instruction is provided for present value calculations. 
 
 
V. Issues for Forensic Economics in North Carolina 
 
A. Hedonic Damages 
 
Damages recoverable for death by wrongful act do not include hedonic damages. 
Livingston v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 601 (E.D.N.C. 1993).  
 
There have been no North Carolina Supreme Court or Court of Appeals decisions on the 
issue of recovering specified hedonic damages for the loss of enjoyment of life in 
personal injury cases. However, there is some latitude in the jury instructions on the pain 
and suffering, the scars and disfigurement, and the loss of use of part of the body 
components of personal injury damages. All three components (NCPI 810.08, 810.10, 
810.12) include the instructions: 
 
Damages for personal injury also include fair compensation for the actual past, 
present, future [physical pain and mental suffering] [scars and disfigurement] 
[loss, or partial loss of the use of  [identified body part(s)]]. There is no fixed 
formula for placing a value on [these conditions]. You must determine what is fair 
compensation by applying logic and common sense to the evidence. 
 
While the phrase “There is no fixed formula for placing a value on these conditions,” 
might be interpreted to allow any method of calculating the value, apparently the next 
sentence with “fair compensation,” “logic,” and “common sense” prevails, and a hedonic 
damages calculation for loss of enjoyment of life in personal injury cases is virtually 
never seen in North Carolina; i.e., the authors know of no such cases. 
 
B. Pre-judgment Interest 
 
Interest on an award in North Carolina has an interesting way of accumulating. By North 
Carolina General Statue 24-5 (b):  
 
In an action other than contract, any portion of a money judgment designated by 
the fact finder as compensatory damages bears interest from the date the action is 
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commenced until the judgment is satisfied. Any other portion of a money 
judgment in an action other than contract, except the costs, bears interest from the 
date of entry of judgment under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 58, until the judgment is 
satisfied. Interest on an award in an action other than contract shall be at the legal 
rate. 
 
Therefore, prejudgment interest on an award for economic damages (compensatory 
damages, but not punitive damages) does not start at the time of the personal injury or 
death, but at the time the action is filed. Interest on punitive damages awards accumulates 
from the date of entry of the judgment. By North Carolina General Statute 24-1, the 
“legal rate of interest” is eight percent per annum. While there is nothing in the statute 
nor in case law addressing whether this is simple or compound interest, common practice 
is to compound the interest. 
 
C. Loss of Consortium 
 
In North Carolina a spouse may be compensated for loss of consortium as long as the 
action for the loss of consortium is joined with any suit “the other spouse may have 
instituted to recover for his or her personal injuries”  Nicholson v. Chatham Hospital, 300 
N.C. 295, 266 S.E. 2d 818 (1980).  Consortium is defined as “it embraces service, 
society, companionship, sexual gratification and affection.” Nicholson v. Chatham 
Hospital.  If the spouse has died, the recovery period is from the time of injury to the time 
of death.  Or, if the couple subsequently divorced the period for recovery is to the date of 
the divorce ( NCPI  810.30.).  In Nicholson v. Chatham Hospital the Court states that the 
wrongful death statute 28A-18-2(b) allows compensation for loss of consortium.  The 
statute does not specifically refer to “consortium” but to “services, protection care and 
assistance” and “society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advice.”   
Even though there may be compensation for lost consortium, forensic economists rarely 
attempt to estimate its value.  
 
As there is an overlap between what the injured spouse has lost and what the non-injured 
spouse has lost (e.g. household services) specific instructions are given to avoid 
duplicating awards. (See NCPI  810.30.) 
 
D. Per Diem Presentations 
 
In a wrongful death action, a per diem argument may be made by counsel for pain and 
suffering. From NCPI 810.56, “An attorney is allowed to suggest an amount of damages 
and therefore can suggest an amount for each [unit of time; e.g., day, hour, minute] of 
physical pain and suffering. Furthermore, an attorney’s argument is not evidence but is 
merely an approach to the damage issue which you may consider but need not adopt.” A 
forensic economist can do the mathematics for the attorney, but that is all. 
 
E. Common Practices in Forensic Economics in North Carolina 
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Reports written by the forensic economist are not required by law, but typically are 
submitted if the case makes it to deposition or trial. Frequently an attorney only wants a 
“number” to use in settlement negotiations – usually in the form of a letter – and requests 
a full report only if a deposition or trial appears to be likely. Reproduction of data sources 
in a report is also not required, but an individual judge or opposition attorney may make 
an issue out of the absence of supporting data. There is no fixed deadline for submitting 
reports in North Carolina courts. A report will be produced whenever the opposing 
attorney asks for it in discovery. 
 
Depositions are commonly taken, but at the same time it is not unusual to testify without 
having given a deposition in the case. The availability of depositions from a plaintiff’s 
economist’s earlier cases obviously assists a defense expert’s preparation for an 
upcoming deposition, but earlier depositions are not guaranteed to be available. 
 
The authors know of no wrongful death/personal injury trials in North Carolina state 
court which were not tried in front of a jury (with twelve members). Other types of trials, 
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     APPENDIX 1      
             
  
                 Number of years of Life Remaining (2002) 
 
 










black   








                   0                75.8  77.3  75.1  80.3  68.8  75.6   
                   5                71.6  72.9  70.7  75.8  65.0  71.7   
                  10               66.6  67.9  65.7  70.8  60.1  66.8   
                  15               61.7  63.0  60.8  65.9  55.2  61.8   
                  20               56.9  58.2  56.1  61.0  50.5  57.0   
                  25               52.2  53.5  51.4  56.1  46.0  52.1   
                  30               47.5  48.7  46.7  51.2  41.6  47.4   
                  35               42.9  44.0  42.0  46.4  37.1  42.7   
                  40               38.3  39.3  37.4  41.6  32.8  38.1   
                  45               33.8  34.8  32.9  36.9  28.5  33.7   
                  50               29.3  30.3  28.5  32.4  24.6  29.5   
                  55               25.1  26.1  24.3  27.9  21.0  25.4   
                  60               21.1  22.0  20.3  23.6  17.6  21.6   
                  65               17.5  18.2  16.6  19.5  14.6  18.0   
                  70               14.2  14.7  13.3  15.8  11.8  14.7   
                  75               11.2  11.5  10.3  12.3  9.5  11.7   
                  80                8.5  8.8  7.7  9.3  7.5  9.2   
 
1 North Carolina General Statue 8-46 
2 National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 53, No. 6, November 10, 2004, Table 1 
3 National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 53, No. 6, November 10, 2004, Table 5 
4 National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 53, No. 6, November 10, 2004, Table 6 
5 National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 53, No. 6, November 10, 2004, Table 8 
6 National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 53, No. 6, November 10, 2004, Table 9
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